The Mexican War and Manifest Destiny

In the 1840's the United States and Mexico did have political conflicts, but it appears the true basis of the war with Mexico was more related to an expression of “Manifest Destiny” than a failure of diplomatic relations.

From the beginning of colonialism a dominate attitude prevailed, "Americans perceived their destined goal. The whole continent was to be theirs! Theirs to exploit, and theirs to make into one mighty nation, a land of opportunity, a showcase to display the virtues of democratic institutions, loving proof that Americans were indeed God’s chosen people.”[01] This attitude continued over the years after the revolution. Then, “By 1840 many Americans had settled far to the west in California, which was unmistakably Mexican territory, and in the Oregon country, jointly claimed by the United States and Britain.”[02]

This era in particular took to heart the phrase, sea to shining sea, more than any before them. It was also true that a doubling of the population every twenty years or so produced tremendous pressures to move out west for the younger generations. New York journalist John L. O’Sullivan wrote in 1845, “to fulfill manifest destiny was to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of the yearly multiplying millions”.[03]

So with some deduction, it can be seen how the population pressures eventually took aim at a target. “In the early 1840’s, fired by the spirit of manifest destiny, the country suddenly burned with Oregon fever”[04] And, like most popular movements or irresistible forces, the need for a leader and the manifestation of just such a person inevitably would collide. These events occur, because of the political vacuums and the self interests which are motivation for a person to fill these niches and receive reward from it. During the 1840’s President Polk made himself the spokesman of American expansion by committing himself to obtaining, in addition to Texas, both Oregon and the Southwest.[05]

But why was such drive and zeal devoted to the push west? Money of course, the greatest motivator was undoubtedly the people that could afford to fund such expeditions, and who expected to profit obscenely for their financial risks.
“Behind the dreams of the Far West as an American Eden lay the commercial

[01] Mark C. Carnes and John A. Garraty, The American Nation: A history of the United States Since 1865, Twelfth Edition, Volume one, (New York: Pearson and Longman, 2006), 321.
[02] Carnes and Garraty, 324.
[03] Carnes and Garraty, 321.
[04] Carnes and Garraty, 324.
[05] Carnes and Garraty, 327.

importance of the three major west coast harbors: San Diego, San Francisco, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca leading into Puget Sound.”[06] Then the key to these riches becomes obvious when one considers how best to transport all the booty and it was not to matter who was going to be in the way. “Eastern merchants considered these harbors the keys to the trade of the Orient. That San Diego and San Francisco were Mexican and the Puget Sound district was claimed by Great Britain only heightened their desire to possess them.”[07]

Therefore, since the goals of powerful Americans of the 1840’s were acquiring land and the extraction of any resources to enrich the economy, it was only a matter of time before the political machinery of America would bare down on the issue. “In the Spring of 1844 expansion did not seem likely to affect the presidential election. The Whigs nominated Clay unanimously and ignored Texas in their party platform. When the Democrats gathered in convention at Baltimore in May, Van Buren appeared to have the nomination in his pocket. He too wanted to keep Texas out of the campaign. John C. Calhoun however, was determined to make Texas a campaign issue.”[08]

One major complication with land acquisition was not the ethics of taking it from the Mexicans or Indian, but whether or not once occupied was it going to be fit to be a slave state. Amazingly, the issues of slavery and Imperialism horning its way into America‘s consciousness and refused to allow the election of 1844 to turn out as expected, “Southerners forced through a rule requiring that a candidate must be approved by a two-thirds majority. Van Buren could not muster that much support. After a brief deadlock, a ‘dark horse’ James K. Polk of Tennessee, swept the convention.”[09]

It was the issue of slavery that enabled an extreme expansionist into office by 1845. “Since Polk carried New York by barely 5000 votes, the votes cast for Birney (the Liberty party) probably cost Clay the state. Had Clay won New York’s 36 electoral votes, he would have been elected with 141 votes to Polk’s 134.”[10] This defeat of Clay, the Whig candidate in favor of restraint, by Polk who the Imperialists were apparently backing because of the personal gains involved for both. Polk gained the finances and advice of the expansion movement, and the movement gained an enthusiastic leader. So, Clay was weakened in the key state of New York by political maneuvers which involving the Liberty party, who were tied back to the Abolitionists. “The decisive factor in the contest was the Liberty party, an anti-slavery splinter group organized in 1840.”[11]

[06] Carnes and Garraty, 324.
[07] Carnes and Garraty, 324.
[08] Carnes and Garraty, 325.
[09] Carnes and Garraty, 325.
[10] Carnes and Garraty, 326.
[11] Carnes and Garraty, 326.

“Polk’s victory was nevertheless taken as a mandate for expansion. Tyler promptly called on Congress to take Texas by joint resolution. Polk accepted this arrangement”[12] Once in office Polk wasted no time in pushing his mandate, how far it could be advanced was just a matter of finding out. Texas was a first step to test the waters of expansion and the public was in a mood for growth. “In addition, Mexico had defaulted on debts owed the United States, which caused some people to suggest using force to obtain the money. But Mexican pride was also involved. Texas had been independent for the better part of a decade, and Mexico had made no serious effort to recover it.”[13]

In July 1845, Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor and 1500 troops into Texas to defend the border, but the location of that border was in dispute. Texas claimed the Rio Grande while Mexico insisted the boundary was the Nueces River, about 150 miles north of the Rio. Taylor stopped on the Nueces River at Corpus Christi and did not march to the Rio Grande, in order to not provoke the Mexican Government.[14] By November 1845, Polk sent an envoy John Slidell on a secret mission to obtain the disputed territory by negotiation. The President authorized the envoy to offer to cancel the Mexican debt, if they accepted the annexation of Texas with the Rio Grande River as boundary.[15] Then the next move on the political chess board was presumably to force the negotiations along, “in December 1845 Texas became a state.”[16] However, it appears the result was to back the Mexican Leaders into a corner on the Texas problem, “Mexico never recognized Texas independence and promptly broke off diplomatic relations when the United States annexed the republic.”[17]

While the Mexicans in charge probably would have faired better by negotiating, they sought to save face and avoid loss of territory. But the Americans were not only intent on annexing Texas, they also wanted more, “The President also empowered Slidell to offer as much as $30 million if Mexico would sell the United States all or part of New Mexico and California.”[18] By now with the threat of hostilities between the two countries began to build. “The Mexican government refused to receive Slidell. Amid a wave of anti-American feeling, a military coup occurred and General Mariano Paredes, the new head of state, promptly reaffirmed his country’s claim to all of Texas.”[19] The American diplomat sent by Polk was not amused,“Slidell returned to Washington convinced that the Mexicans would not give as inch until they had been “chastised.”[20]

[12] Carnes and Garraty, 326.
[13] Carnes and Garraty, 327.
[14] Carnes and Garraty, 328.
[15] Carnes and Garraty, 328.
[16] Carnes and Garraty, 326.
[17] Carnes and Garraty, 328.
[18] Carnes and Garraty, 328.
[19] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[20] Carnes and Garraty, 329.

But it did not matter to Polk that the Mexicans had refused his offer, by the time he heard their response he had already made other plans. “Polk had already ordered Taylor to advance to the Rio Grande. By late March 1846 the army, swelled to about 4000, had taken up positions near the Mexican town of Matamoros.”[21] Soon, the two governments’ armies began to annoy each other, and the inevitable hostilities broke out. By April 1846, the Mexicans crossed the disputed river boundary to confront the Americans, but were easily driven back. When news of the skirmish reached Washington, Polk seized upon the event to provoke Congress into declaring war.[22]

Polk states to Congress ”war exists”, they accept this reasoning and proceed to vote in funding and supplies for an additional 50,000 troops without officially declaring war on Mexico.[23] At about this same time period Polk appears willing to negotiating with the British, as well as the Mexicans. During talks the Americans utilize bluff and threat to settle their differences on the west, soon a deal is struck. “British foreign secretary Lord Aberdeen, hastily suggested Polk’s earlier proposal, dividing the Oregon territory along the 49th parallel. Polk, abandoning his belligerent attitude, agreed.”[24] This deal was popular in America and achieved Polk’s objective, “the treaty so obviously accorded with the national interest that the Senate approved it by a large majority in June 1846. Polk was then free to take up the Texas question in earnest.”[25]

By maneuvering peace with the British, the Americans were free and clear to handle the Mexican problem. A minor concern militarily, since the land itself was not heavily populated with Mexicans, it was more of a delicate matter of politics. Military Officer Thomas Hart Benton said, “a small war, just large enough to require a treaty of peace, and not large enough to make military reputations dangerous for the presidency.”[26] So, rather than seeking a diplomatic solution however long it took, Polk chose to expedite his agenda by force. “war had broken out in large measure because of the expansionist spirit, and the confidence born of its overwhelming advantages of size and wealth certainly encouraged the United States to bully Mexico."[27]

But it was more like a teenager beating up his little brother for his piggy bank, than a real war, “From the first battle, the outcome of the Mexican War was never in doubt. At Palo Alto, north of the Rio Grande, 2300 Americans scattered a Mexican force more than twice their number. Then, hotly pursuing, 1700 Americans routed 7500 Mexicans at Resaca de la Palma.”[28] These may seem like exaggerated numbers, but “The Mexican

[21] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[22] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[23] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[24] Carnes and Garraty, 327.
[25] Carnes and Garraty, 327.
[26] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[27] Carnes and Garraty, 327.
[28] Carnes and Garraty, 329.

army was poorly equipped and, despite a surfeit of high-ranking officers, poorly led.”[29] While their enemies the Americans were spoiling for the fight, “The well equipped American forces and a hard core of youthful West Pointers eager to make their reputations and regulars trained in Indian warfare to provide the leadership needed to turn volunteer soldiers into first-rate fighting men.”[30] And the cost of battle for the Americans was slight because of the plentiful supplies and able commanders, “Fewer than 50 United States soldiers lost their lives in these engagements, while Mexican losses in killed, wounded, and captured exceeded 1000.”[31]

Meanwhile the task of conquering most of the Mexican Empire was going to prove to be a challenge no matter what. “Yet Mexico was a large, rugged country with few decent roads; conquering it proved to be a formidable task.”[32] But the dreams of imperialism did not occur within the hearts of the faint and had been long contemplated, “Polk’s design for prosecuting the war consisted of three parts. First, he would clear the Mexicans from Texas and occupy the northern providences of Mexico. Second, he would take possession of California and New Mexico. Finally, he would march on Mexico City.”[33]

However, ambition is usually very hard to conceal, so Polk was not without his detractors, “Many Northerners feared that the war would lead to the expansion of slavery. Others--among them an obscure Illinois congressman named Abraham Lincoln--felt that Polk had misled Congress about the original outbreak of fighting and that the United States was the aggressor.”[34] These Americans were not as enthusiastic about the thrashing of a weaker country in order to take territory and were concerned what was to be done with it once annexed. “Abolitionists, led by William Lloyd Garrison, called it an “invasion … waged solely for the detestable and horrible purpose of extending and perpetuating American slavery.”[35]

Besides Polk’s obvious weakness for expansion, another weakness was to allowed political decisions to influence who he chose as General for the critical campaign. He chose Zachary Taylor because of His lack of political ambitions and ignored the superior military knowledge of Winfield Scott. Even so, Taylor was able to defeat Mexican forces three times larger than his own at Buena Vista in February 1847.[36] Another problem Polk had was, “the farther from the Rio Grande one went in the

[29] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[30] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[31] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[32] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[33] Carnes and Garraty, 330.
[34] Carnes and Garraty, 329.
[35] Carnes and Garraty, 332.
[36] Carnes and Garraty, 329.

United States, the less popular “Mr. Polk’s war” became.”[37]

Slowly political woes were overcome with American victories by General Taylor, Captain Fremont at Sonoma and Commodore Sloat at Monterey and San Francisco. These victories helped to quell the uproar of public opinion against the war, apparently because of the perceived rewards won of Mexican provinces as the Americans controlled all territory north of the capital city.[38]

Then the hardest part of the campaign was to begin, but Polk had doubts, “The campaign against Mexico City was the most difficult of the war. Fearful of Taylor’s growing popularity and entertaining certain honest misgivings about his ability to oversee a complicated campaign, Polk put Winfield Scott in charge of the offensive.”[39] After taking command in March 1847, General Scott led a series of military battles to maneuver his army into position to attack Mexico City in September of that same year.[40] Scott did show an unusual propensity to outmaneuver militarily any of the foolish political desires ordered upon him.

In fact most American military leaders did well, “In every engagement the American troops had been outnumbered, yet they always exacted a far heavier toll from the defenders that themselves were forced to pay.[41] Scott was particularly praised, “No less an authority than the Duke of Wellington, the conqueror of Napoleon, called Scott’s campaign the most brilliant of modern times.”[42]

As usual, the politicians are there just in time to take all the credit, right after all the soldiers are through dying. “Polk sent Nicholas P. Trist, chief clerk of the State department, to accompany Scott’s army and to act as peace commissioner after the fall of Mexico City.”[43] Unfortunately, the war was successful in disrupting the Mexican government as well as it did the Mexican army. This impeded a quick end to the war, “Because of the confused state of affairs following the fall of Mexico City, Trist was unable to open negotiations with Mexican peace commissioners until January 1848.”[44]

But while the negotiating dragged on, Polk became impatient with the delay, and began to second guess how weak the Mexican government was and if he could demand more territory for less money. He recalled Trist, but Trist and Scott realized that if a deal was not struck on the spot, the Mexican government would collapse without any

[37] Carnes and Garraty, 330.
[38] Carnes and Garraty, 330.
[39] Carnes and Garraty, 330.
[40] Carnes and Garraty, 331.
[41] Carnes and Garraty, 331.
[42] Carnes and Garraty, 331.
[43] Carnes and Garraty, 331.
[44] Carnes and Garraty, 331.

treaty. Therefore the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was completed in February 1848.[45] Then Polk was so irritated at Trist for disobeying orders, Polk had Trist arrested and fired from the state department. But Polk had no choice except to keep the treaty, because the war had become so unpopular, Polk dare not push the Public or Congress further.[46]

For settling debts and payments amounting to over 18 million dollars, the United States bought the areas of California, New Mexico and the boundary for Texas was settled with Mexico.[47] For America, war with Mexico, “Brought huge territorial gains. The Pacific coast from south of San Diego to the 49th parallel and all the land between the coast and continental divide had become the property of the American people.”[48]

With the discovery of gold deposits in California in January 1848, it seemed to the Americans that God had once again blessed them. This time the legend of El Dorado was real, and would add over 200 million new dollars to the American economy between 1848-1852.[49] The gold rush reflected the heady confidence inspired by Guadalupe Hidalgo; it seemed the ultimate justification of manifest destiny. Surely an era of continental prosperity and harmony had dawned.”[50]

The United States and Mexico did have political conflicts during the 1840's. But the true basis of the war with Mexico was an expression of “Manifest Destiny“, rather than a failure of diplomatic relations.

[45] Carnes and Garraty, 332.
[46] Carnes and Garraty, 332.
[47] Carnes and Garraty, 332.
[48] Carnes and Garraty, 332.
[49] Carnes and Garraty, 332.
[50] Carnes and Garraty, 332.

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